The French military strategy was further weakened after the death of Chad’s president Idriss Déby in clashes with non-Islamist forces in 2020. Up to 5,000 troops have been deployed, working with United Nations (UN) troops and other Western special forces, but it has had limited impact.Īrguably this is only the latest in a series of military interventions against Islamist forces which have ended up acting as a ‘praetorian guard’ to unpopular and predatory governments such as those in Mali, and failing to address the root causes of violence. The French intervention in the Sahel since 2013 has been characterized as an effort to stabilize a troubled former colonial region, and is mainly a military effort to defeat these Islamist groups. Rethinking the response to jihadist groups across the Sahel ![]() Repeated coups – in 2012, 20 – and a history of repression of the northern population, have done more to expand jihadism than the military strength of Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State (IS) in the Greater Sahara, Ansarul Islam, or the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. Mali offers a clear example of how structural failings, poor governance, and weak state security have been the main cause of the growing insurgency, and long predate the ‘war on terror’ narrative. The line between jihadism, organized crime, and local politics is often blurred and further complicated by global factors such as climate change, population growth, and migration. However, insurgent groups are often riven by internal conflicts and motivated just as much by local objectives as by any international jihadist mission. Insurgent groups are often riven by internal conflicts and motivated as much by local objectives as by any international jihadist mission. This was true of the French authorities in Algeria, the British in Kenya during the 1950s, the Rhodesian government during the 1970s, and the South African Apartheid regime. In Africa especially, colonial powers labelled independence movements as terrorists to retain power, demonize their adversaries, and justify the use of extreme retaliatory measures. But it is also true that, throughout the 20th century, weak, corrupt, and colonial regimes branded opponents ‘terrorists’ as a way to delegitimize their objectives. On many occasions it is the right description for obscene acts of violence perpetrated against civilians, such as the June 2021 attack in Burkina Faso. The causes of violence against civilians in one African nation differ greatly from another – just as in Europe the UK’s history of sectarian and religious violence is different to that of Serbia’s. Third, there are no easy, universal reasons for the roots of terror in Africa, the world’s second largest and most populous continent. ![]() This habit can create problems as designating insurgent groups as ‘terrorists’ makes it much harder for governments to de-escalate conflict and negotiate peaceful settlements with insurgent groups. Second, the term is often applied by western policymakers attempting to impose order on fluid, highly-factionalized situations. There are no easy, universal reasons for the roots of terror in Africa
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